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WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT:
WHERE DO THE BRICs STAND?
Thomas Osang*
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the absolute and relative contribution by Brazil,
Russia, India, and China (BRIC) on world trade and foreign direct in vest-
ment over the past three decades. In addition, we briefly discuss major
achievements as well as remaining shortcomings of the international trade
and foreign investment policy reforms implemented by the BRICs over the
same period. Empirical estimates of the long-run equilibrium relationship
in exports between the BRICs and the G3 (United States, Japan, and Ger-
many) as well as the role of the BRICs' economic performance within a
larger cross-section time-series data framework are also presented.
I. INTRODUCTIONA T the time of Mao Zedong's death in 1976, very few, if any, polit-
ical or economic commentators predicted that thirty-five years
later, China would be a major economic player in the world mar-
ket for traded goods and services as well as a major recipient and an
important contributor of international financial capital. Yet, this is pre-
cisely what has happened. After many economic reforms that created a
large private sector with modest regulation by the government, China is
now the largest exporter of goods in the world with merchandise exports
valued at $1.58 trillion USD in 2010, the world's second largest trading
nation with a total trade volume (exports and imports of goods and ser-
vices) valued at $3.35 trillion USD, the largest recipient of foreign direct
investment among developing countries ($185 billion USD in 2010), and
an important contributor to foreign investment abroad with a total value
of $60 billion USD in direct investment abroad in 2010.2
1. I would like to thank S. Stuart Smith for excellent research assistance.
* Thomas Osang is an Associate Professor & Altshuler Distinguished Teaching Pro-
fessor in the Department of Economics at Southern Methodist University. He also
serves as Fellow at the John G. Tower Center for Political Studies. Professor
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ment. His most cited papers include "Exchange-Rate Volatility and Foreign Trade:
Evidence from Thirteen LDCs" Journal of Business & Economic Statistics and
"Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment" American Economic
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San Diego.
2. Unless otherwise noted, here and throughout the remainder of the paper, trade
data are taken from the WTO trade statistics data base, available online at
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Similar but somewhat less dramatic changes have occurred in Brazil,
Russia, and India over the past three and a half decades. In the mid-
1970s, Russia was still heavily engaged in fighting the Cold War with the
West, both in Europe and in other regions of the world. Russia's cen-
trally-planned economy was skewed toward the production of investment
goods, leading to an acute shortage of consumption goods. Moreover, its
participation in the international division of labor was mostly confined to
barter trade with other centrally-planned economies. In the 1970s, In-
dia's policy makers still believed in development through self-reliance,
making it nearly impossible for foreign firms to gain access to India's
economy through trade or foreign investment. Brazil, though more open
than India and Russia at the time, favored a development strategy known
as import substitution, which required the imposition of high tariffs and
other trade barriers on foreign exporters to protect nascent domestic in-
dustries from the harsh winds of the world market.
Since then, Russia has transformed its economy from centrally-planned
to market driven; India has changed its insistence on self-reliance and
opened its economy to foreign trade and investment; and Brazil has aban-
doned its import substitution doctrine by dramatically lowering trade and
non-trade barriers on goods and services from abroad. As a result of
economic and, often, political reforms, the BRICs are now more involved
in the international division of labor than at any other point during the
last one hundred years. And given the scale of each country, both in
terms of population and geographic size, the BRICs have become major
players at the world level in terms of economic output, trade, and foreign
investment.
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we will describe and com-
pare the major economic reforms in the areas of trade and foreign invest-
ment that transformed the BRICs from relatively closed to comparatively
open economies. Second, we will analyze the absolute and relative
changes in trade and investment flows that occurred over the past two to
three decades in each of the BRIC countries and compare the BRICs'
performance in these areas to that of the G3. Finally, we tackle two em-
pirical questions. First, we examine whether there exists a long-run equi-
librium relationship between the export performances of the established
leaders in globalization, the G3 on one hand and the BRICs on the other.
Second, we investigate whether there is any evidence for a BRICs effect
in economic performance within a sample of 120 countries and forty years
of observations.
www.wto.org, while the foreign investment data are from the World Bank's World
Development Indicators data base, available online at www.worldbank.org.
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II. REFORM OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES IN
THE BRICS
Since the mid-1970s, each BRIC country has undergone a number of
major economic reforms that have had a long-lasting impact on trade and
investment flows with the rest of the world.
A. TRADE POLIcy REFORMS
The Brazilian case is unique in that the country has had fairly liberal
policies with regard to foreign investment flows since the 1970s, while at
the same time restricting the importation of goods and services in accor-
dance with the country's import substitution policy. Once Brazil realized
that these restrictive policies did not yield the expected progress in terms
of economic development, the country embarked on a radical paradigm
shift. Between 1987 and 1997, major economic reforms drastically re-
moved much of Brazil's trade barriers so that by the end of this reform
period, the level of import tariffs was only one-tenth of that in 1987 (Fer-
reira and Rossi, 2003). Despite these impressive reforms, there is room
to push the trade liberalization process even further. According to the
recent World Bank estimates of the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index
(OTRI)-an index that measures both tariff and non-tariff barriers to
trade-for the period 2006 through 2009, Brazil had the worst perform-
ance of the BRICs and was ranked 88th out of 125 ranked countries in
the sample (see Table 1, Panel A). 3 If only tariff barriers are considered
(Table 1, Panel B), Brazil's ranking is even worse (93rd), with an average
tariff of 9.3 percent.
For many decades after independence in 1948, India pursued a devel-
opment policy that favored self-reliance over international specialization
of production. Trade barriers were substantial and import tariffs were
among the highest of any in the world. But starting in 1991, India em-
barked on a path that would lead the country away from the idea of
autarkic development and towards greater openness with respect to for-
eign trade and investment. At the center of these reforms were substan-
tial reductions in import tariffs (Ahluwalia, 2002). Nevertheless, given
that India began its trade policy reform from such high levels of protec-
tionism, it may not be surprising that its openness to trade today is still
falling short of that of many other countries. In terms of the OTRI, India
ranks 78th in the world today, ahead of Russia and Brazil but way behind
the G3 and China (see Table 1, Panel A). The main reason for this poor
ranking is that India's tariff rates are still very high. India's average im-
port tariff stands currently at 12 percent (ranked 102nd in the world), far
above those in the G3 and the other BRICs (see Table 1, Panel B).
The changes in Russia's trade policy since 1992 have been dramatic and
far reaching but also more volatile than in the other BRIC countries over
3. For details on the construction of the OTRI and related trade restrictiveness indi-
ces, Kee et al. (2009).
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the same time period (Bessonova et al., 2002; Tarr and Volchkova, 2010).
Until 1992, international trade was centrally planned and consisted
mainly of barter trade with other command economies of the Eastern
Bloc. This changed radically in 1992 when the state monopoly on foreign
trade was replaced with market driven trade. But, in the same year, the
government introduced export taxes to generate revenues and granted
import subsidies to protect struggling domestic industries. A year later,
import tariffs were introduced as an additional protective measure. Im-
port subsidies, however, were eliminated in 1994. The years 1995 and
1996 saw the reduction of certain import tariffs and the elimination of all
export taxes in the context of the IMF-led stabilization programs. But
two years later, the government reintroduced an export tax on oil ex-
ports, mainly as a way to increase its overall tax revenues.
In the early 2000s, there were more reductions in import tariffs that
coincided with a movement toward a more uniform tariff rate. As Figure
1 demonstrates, the ups and downs of Russia's movement toward freer
trade continued throughout the first decade of the new millennium. The
tax rate on all types of international transactions (imports, exports, etc.)
appears to increase through most of the decade before falling again after
2006. Russia's two-decade-long struggle with trade reforms and trade lib-
eralization culminated in the approval of its WTO membership applica-
tion in December of 2011. Similar to Brazil and India, Russia has
substantial room for further rounds of trade liberalizations. It is currently
ranked 84th in terms of its overall trade restrictiveness and 70th in terms
of the restrictiveness of its import tariffs (Table 1, Panels A and B).
The economic reforms that gradually transformed China into an out-
ward oriented economy began at least a decade earlier than in the other
BRICs (Panagariya, 1993; Naughton, 2007). As a result, China enjoyed a
substantial globalization head start, which may explain why the country
plays a more important role in the world market for traded goods and
investment than the other BRICs, as we will see below. Nevertheless, the
Chinese trade miracle did not really begin until 1992, more than a decade
after the first round of trade reforms. Compared to the other BRICs,
China has also been more serious about the removal of trade barriers,
both tariff and non-tariff. As Table 2 shows, this is particularly true for
the 2000s. Whereas China was ranked 72nd in terms of its overall trade
restrictiveness at the beginning of the decade, its ranking improved to
55th between 2005 and 2008, and even further to 28th by the end of dec-
ade. Not only did China distance itself from the other BRICs whose
OTRI rankings remained more or less the same throughout the decade,
China also moved ahead of Japan and Germany, leaving the United
States as the only G3 country that restricts trade less than China (see
Table 1, Panel A). China still has room to improve in terms of MFN tariff
levels. At 5.3 percent between 2006 and 2009, they are still higher than
those in the G3 and only marginally lower than those in Russia.
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B. REFORMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES
In contrast to its protectionist trade policies, Brazil's policies toward
foreign investment inflows have been fairly liberal for a long time (Motta
Veiga, 2004). During the 1990s, further reforms led to the opening of the
IT sector to foreign investors and a simplification of the registration pro-
cedure for foreign direct investments. In the mid-1990s, a constitutional
reform ended the state monopoly in the oil, gas, and telecom industries.
As shown in Table 3, Brazil is by far the most open BRIC country with
regard to foreign direct investment today. Brazil's overall FDI index in
2010 stood at 0.116, with 1 indicating a completely closed and zero a com-
pletely open economy with regard to FDI. Brazil's FDI index is even
more impressive when compared to the average FDI index for all OECD
countries, which, at 0.095, stands only slightly below that of Brazil.
Russia's policies toward FDI changed dramatically when the country
began its transition toward a market economy (Bessonova et al., 2002;
Tarr and Volchkova, 2010). Joint ventures were allowed as early as 1989,
while fully foreign-owned enterprises became legal in 1991. During the
process of privatization of government assets that began in the 1990s, for-
eign investors were officially allowed to participate, but faced significant
levels of discrimination in the process. This ambiguous attitude toward
foreign direct investment is reflected in the data (see Table 3). Russia's
overall FDI index was 0.384, more than four times above the OECD av-
erage. Russia's index is pushed up due to a combination of equity and
operational restrictions.
India's policies toward foreign direct investment changed along with
their policies regarding foreign trade (Panagariya, 2008). Throughout the
1990s and 2000s, the country gradually opened more and more sectors to
foreign investors, but often kept certain equity restrictions in place. To-
day, the country is second among the BRICs in terms of openness toward
foreign direct investment, with an overall FDI restrictiveness index of
0.220 in 2010, about twice the level of Brazil but half that of China. The
reason for the relatively high index number is due solely to equity restric-
tions. In the other dimensions that contribute to the overall score
(screening, key personnel, and operational restrictions), foreign invest-
ment flows into India are essentially unrestricted. While India's FDI poli-
cies may be less proactive than those in China (see Huang and Tang,
2012), it has pursued comprehensive domestic reforms through explicit
privatization and deeper financial liberalization, a fact that is often as im-
portant for foreign investors as the removal of direct investment barriers.
China has pursued a process of gradual foreign investment liberaliza-
tion since the 1980s, but linked its reform process to two distinct FDI
objectives: export promotion and technology transfer (Long, 2005).
While export promotion was mandatory initially, today it is mostly neu-
tral or even voluntary. From the perspective of investors from the ad-
vanced economies, the main issues with China's current FDI policies are
its insistence on "indigenous innovation policies, forced technology trans-
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fer requirements, [and a] porous intellectual property enforcement re-
gime." 4 While public criticism of China's FDI policies from Western
policy makers or business leaders is rare, the following statement by Rob
Atkinson, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foun-
dation, a Washington based think tank, appears to reflect the current sen-
timent of many foreign investors with ties to China: "There's been a
significant shift in top-level Chinese economic strategy away from at-
tracting multinational foreign direct investment to unfairly supporting
Chinese-owned companies."5 Given the current level of restrictions that
China imposes on foreign investors, it is not surprising that China's FDI
restrictiveness index, at 0.457, is by far the highest among the BRICs (see
Table 3). The overall score is high due to comparatively large values in
all four subcategories.
III. CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF
LABOR OVER TIME
There is no doubt that the international division of labor has changed
dramatically over the past three decades, and much of it has to do with
the emergence of the BRICs as a major player in the global market place.
A. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The BRICs have increased their value of total trade (exports and im-
ports of goods and services) from $615 billion USD in 1996 to $4.5 trillion
USD in 2010, a more than sevenfold increase. Over the same time span,
world trade increased from $10 trillion USD to $30.1 trillion, a mere
threefold gain (see Figure 2). Also, trade by BRICs fared better during
the world financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. In 2009, BRIC trade shrunk
by 18 percent, compared to a 23 percent decline for world trade. When
trade rebounded in 2010, BRIC trade increased by 34 percent compared
to a worldwide rise of 21 percent.
An even more impressive picture emerges if one compares total trade
shares6 for the BRICs with those for the G3 countries (Figure 3). All G3
countries have seen a more or less continuous decline in their trade
shares over the past fifteen years. The United States' share fell from 18
percent to 11 percent between 1996 and 2010, while Germany's share de-
clined more modestly from 10 percent to 8 percent. Japan saw its share
tumble by about a third, from 7.5 percent to 5 percent. In contrast, the
BRICs' share in world trade has improved steadily since 2000 and
reached an all-time high of 15 percent in 2010, while the G3 share hit an
all-time low of 23 percent. If the BRIC-G3 shares continue to move in
4. D.J. Ikenson, "Trade Policy Priority One: Averting a U.S.-China 'Trade War,"'
Free Trade Bulletin No. 47, The Cato Institute, March 5, 2012.
5. "Focus shifts from China's currency to its other trade policies," Los Angeles
Times, February 14, 2012.
6. The total trade share is defined as the ratio between a country's total trade volume
and the volume of total trade of the world.
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opposite directions, the two country groups will eventually reach parity in
terms of their contribution to word trade.
As Figure 4 reveals, the trade performance of the BRICs was by no
means uniform. While Brazil, Russia, and India improved their total
trade volume from around $50 billion USD each in the early 1990s to
around $500 billion USD each in recent years, their performances were
dwarfed by the Chinese trade miracle. In 1992, China's total trade stood
at $165 billion USD, compared to a combined total for India and Brazil
of $103 billion USD, a ratio of 1.6 in favor of China. By 2010, the com-
bined trade value for India and Brazil had increased to $947 billion USD,
but China's trade value had risen to $2.974 trillion USD, three times that
of India and Brazil.
But the BRICs are heterogeneous in other dimensions as well. When
total trade is scaled by population size, three different patterns emerge
(see Figure 5). Russia, the BRIC country with the highest per capita in-
come, also has the highest trade per capita (also referred to as trade in-
tensity) values over the past decade and a half. On the low side is India,
whose trade intensity is substantially below that of the other BRICs. In
the middle are Brazil and China, whose trade-per-capita ratios have been
close to each other for the last ten years, but for very different reasons.
While Brazil's trade intensity is driven by a fairly high per capita income
but a low trade-to-GDP ratio, the exact opposite is true for China where
a high trade share is combined with a relatively low GDP per capita.
When compared to the G3, the BRICs' trade intensity is still extremely
low, despite the enormous increase in trade over the last fifteen years. In
2010, Germany's trade-per-capita ratio stood at $28,600 USD compared
to an average of $1,600 USD for the BRICs, different by a factor of eigh-
teen. Nevertheless, in 1996, Germany's trade intensity was forty-eight
times larger than the average trade intensity of the BRICs, which
amounted to only $250 USD at the time. Despite this remarkable catch-
up process, it will take a long time, if ever, for the BRICs to reach the
trade intensity of the German economy. The per capita trade values of
the United States and Japan are in between those of Germany and the
BRICs, with the U.S. numbers higher due to the large value of U.S. im-
ports. In terms of exports per capita, the ordering between Japan and the
United States is reversed.
B. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Given the number of policy reforms in the financial sector that oc-
curred in the BRICs over the last three decades, we should expect the
BRICs to become more and more attractive destinations for foreign in-
vestors, in particular those who seek longer-term investments that include
the elements of ownership and control (foreign direct investment). But,
as shown in Figure 7, this is only partially the case. Between 1994 and
2000, the BRICs' share of FDI inflows fell from 14.9 percent to 4.8 per-
cent. Since then, the FDI inflow share of the BRICs has risen steadily,
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but it was not until 2008, when the share reached almost 18 percent, that
it exceeded the 1994 level. So what happened? It turns out that the U-
shaped graph in Figure 7 has little to do with investor confidence or a lack
thereof in the BRICs; rather, it has to do with boom and bust periods in
the advanced economies. During the 1990s, the technology and dot-com
investment mania in the OECD countries caused an incredible rise in
FDI inflows. Between 1994 and 2000, worldwide FDI inflows rose from
$259 billion USD to $1.62 trillion USD, a six-fold increase. FDI into the
BRICs rose steadily as well over the same time period, but it merely
doubled, from $38.5 billion USD in 1994 to $77.5 billion USD in 2000.
As a result of this relative "underperformance" of the BRICs, their
share of worldwide FDI inflows shrunk by two-thirds between 1994 and
2000. But within the next five years, the BRICs were able to double their
FDI inflows again, to $153 billion USD in 2005. With the bursting of the
technology bubble in 2000, foreign investment in the advanced economies
fell substantially, and in 2005, it stood at only 75 percent of its 2000 level.
As a result, the BRICs share in worldwide FDI was able to gain ground
fast, reaching 12.6 percent in 2005. Finally, the bursting of the housing
bubble in some of the advanced economies and the subsequent world-
wide financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 was another blow to foreign direct
investment in the OECD countries. As a result, worldwide FDI inflows
increased by only 8 percent between 2005 and 2010. In contrast, the
BRICs, whose economies remained relatively unaffected by the boom
and bust cycle in the rich countries, continued to grow along their trend
line and were able to double their FDI inflows again over the next five
year period, reaching $300 billion USD in 2010.
Once again, it is important to know whether FDI inflows were more or
less homogeneous across the four BRICs. The answer is given in Figure
8. As is the case with international trade flows, China is also the biggest
recipient of foreign direct investment among the BRICs.7 China's share
of worldwide FDI inflows varied from a low of 2.4 percent in 2000 to a
high of 13.9 percent in 2010. China's average annual share of FDI inflows
over the 1994 through 2010 period was 8 percent, compared to 4.5 per-
cent for the other BRICs (the BRIs). But these averages hide the sub-
stantial convergence in FDI inflows between China and the BRIs that
occurred during this period. In 1994, China's FDI inflow share was more
than seven times that of the BRIs, while by 2008 the two shares were
close to parity. Given its longstanding openness to FDI, it is not surpris-
ing that Brazil is the second largest recipient of FDI among the BRICs,
with an average share of 2.3 percent over the sample period. But with the
beginning of the natural resource boom in the mid-2000s, Russia has at-
tracted more and more foreign investment, and between 2006 and 2009
surpassed Brazil as the second largest recipient of FDI among the BRICs.
India, whose openness to FDI is a more recent phenomenon, is by far the
7. It is noteworthy that China's FDI inflows would be even larger if its foreign direct
investment policies were less restrictive (see infra Part II.B).
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smallest FDI recipient among the BRICs, with an average share of less
than 1 percent between 1994 and 2010.
The importance of Brazil and, in recent years, Russia as destination
countries for foreign investors becomes even more apparent when we
scale FDI inflows by population size (Figure 9). Since 2003, Brazil and
Russia have outperformed China and India in terms of FDI per capita.
Over the sample period, foreigners invested $125 USD per Brazilian each
year, about the same as in Russia ($124 USD). The corresponding num-
bers for China and India are $61 USD and $10 USD, respectively. This
gap in FDI intensity between the more advanced economies of Russia
and Brazil on the one side and the less developed economies of China
and India on the other is quite striking.
As Figure 10 shows, the BRICs are not yet major players in the world
market in terms of direct investment abroad (DIA) or FDI outflows.
This is not unexpected because all four of the BRICs are classified as
developing countries by the World Bank, and as such should be major
destinations and not sources of international direct investment. On aver-
age, the Eurozone countries and the United States account for close to 60
percent of worldwide DIA over the sample period, compared to 4.4 per-
cent for Japan and 3 percent for the BRICs.8 Interestingly, while Japan's
share has been fairly constant between 1994 and 2010, the share of the
BRICs has increased steadily and has exceeded the Japanese share since
2003. The rise in DIA by the BRICs has been driven by Russia and
China. In the case of Russia, this partly reflects the rising capital flight by
the nation's oligarchs in response to uncertainty about the country's polit-
ical and socio-economic stability in the near future.9 In contrast, re-
source-scarce China has stepped up its foreign investment into resource
rich economies in Africa, South America, and Australia in recent years to
secure the necessary raw materials for its fast-growing energy and manu-
facturing sectors.' 0
IV. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
This section tackles two different empirical questions related to the
BRICs. First, we investigate whether there exists a long-run equilibrium
relationship in exports between the G3 countries and the BRICs (see Fig-
ure 11).11 If such an equilibrium were to exist, it would be further evi-
8. These numbers appear to contradict the large-scale purchases of U.S. Treasuries by
China and other Asian, as well as Middle Eastern, countries over the past fifteen
to twenty years. But these international investments are classified as foreign port-
folio investments, which are tracked separately from foreign direct investments.
9. "Russia's Capital Flight Intensifies," The Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2012.
10. "China's Investment in Africa to Increase to $50 Billion by 2015, Bank Says,"
Bloomberg, February 22, 2011.
11. We are also interested in the related issue of the existence of a long-run equilib-
rium relationship in FDI between the G3 and the BRICs. Unfortunately, to inves-
tigate this hypothesis requires longer time series data for FDI than are currently
available for the BRICs. But some time series evidence on FDI in the BRICs has
recently begun to emerge (see, e.g., Vijayakumar et al., 2010).
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dence that the BRICs have been able to hold their own when compared
to the world leaders in globalization. Second, we test the hypothesis that
the BRICs, as a group, made a larger contribution to economic perform-
ance (measured by GDP per capita) than other countries in the world
over a forty-year period. Finding such an effect would strengthen the
belief that the BRICs will indeed be the engine of growth in the world for
the foreseeable future.
A. LONG-RUN TRADE EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN BRICS AND G3
In order to test the hypothesis of a long-run equilibrating relationship
in exports between the BRICs and the G3, we first need to determine
whether the two time series variables are stationary or non-stationary.
That is, whether the autoregressive process that characterizes their move-
ment over time contains a unit root (non-stationary) or not. To do this,
we perform two tests that are frequently used in the unit root literature:
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) and the Phillips-Peron test
(PP).12 Both test statistics show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of non-stationarity for both time series at the 1 percent significance level.
We then transform the data by taking first differences and retest both
time series. This time, both test statistics reject the unit root null hypoth-
esis for both time series. Based on the unit root tests, we conclude that
both export time series are best characterized as I(1) processes.
We can, therefore, proceed to our next question, namely whether there
exists a combination of these two non-stationary time series such that the
combined time series is stationary. To find out, we need to estimate the
long-run (cointegrating) relationship between the two variables using a
cointegration estimation procedure. Among the many possible choices,
we report the widely used parametric estimation method by Johansen
(Johansen, 1991; Johansen and Juselius, 1990). The results are given in
Table 4. With two time series, there are three possible outcomes. The
tests' results of the Johansen approach may reveal that no cointegration
vector exists, the existence of a single cointegrating vector, or the exis-
tence of two cointegrating relationships (two cointegrating vectors). The
last case implies that the two variables are not integrated of order 1, while
the first one reveals that the non-stationary variables are not
cointegrated. Therefore, the only case that provides evidence for the ex-
istence of long-run equilibrium in exports between G3 and BRICs is the
single cointegrating vector outcome. There are two Likelihood Ratio
(LR) tests, the max eigenvalue (or max lambda) test and the trace test,
each of which is used to determine the number of cointegrating vectors in
our two time series system.
As shown in Table 4, both tests reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegrating vectors in favor of the alternative (1 or 2 cointegrating vec-
12. All estimations in section IV.A were performed using EasyReg International
(Bierens, 2012). The unit root test results are available from the author upon
request.
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tors) at the usual levels of significance (20%, 10%, 5%). Furthermore,
both LR tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of a singly cointegrating
vector (compared to the alternative of 2 cointegrating vectors). We thus
conclude that the empirical test results of the Johansen procedure point
to the existence of a single cointegrating vector and in turn a long-run
equilibrium relationship in exports between the G3 and the BRICs. The
estimate of the cointegrating relationship coefficient, based on the simple
regression of G3 exports and BRIC exports (with heteroscedasticity con-
sistent t-statistics in parentheses), is given at the bottom of Table 4. It
implies that for every additional dollar in exports by the BRICs the G3
increase their exports by $1.43.
B. BRICs AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Given the strong and well-documented economic performance of the
BRICs, it should be straightforward to demonstrate a "BRICs effect" on
economic development using a data set comprised of more than one hun-
dred and twenty countries and covering more than forty time periods.
The dependent variable is GDP per capita (in constant USD) and the
regressors comprise a list of variables covering the quality of government
institutions, the economy's connection to the rest of the world (globaliza-
tion), and measures of geography. To estimate the full model, we use
both random effects (RE) and Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimators.' 3 In
addition, we use the fixed-effect (FE) estimator to control for unobserved
time-invariant country-specific effects. Note that in this case the coeffi-
cient estimates of the time invariant regressors-such as the geography
measures-are lost. The data set covers the period from 1960 to 2000,
with the annual data transformed into decadal averages to account for
business cycle and other long-term time effects.
The results are presented in Table 5. The first three columns show the
RE, FE, and HT estimation results, respectively, for the full empirical
model including the BRICs dummy. As noted above, in the FE model
the time-invariant BRICs dummy must be dropped from the regression
due to the inclusion of the country dummies. While the estimated coeffi-
cients of the variables measuring institutions, globalization, and geogra-
phy are statistically significant at the 5 percent level and carry the
expected signs, the BRICs dummy coefficient estimates in columns two
and three are not significant and carry a negative sign. We therefore con-
clude that for the full sample period and after controlling for important
determinants of development, there is no evidence that the BRICs per-
formed better or worse than the rest of the countries in the sample.
At first glance, this result is somewhat surprising; after all, Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, and China became the BRICs due to their high-growth per-
13. For a discussion of the Hausman-Taylor estimator, as well as variable definitions
and data sources used in the panel model estimations, see Jacob and Osang (2011;
available at http://www.faculty.smu.edu/tosang/pdf/jacob-osang.pdf). Estimates
are generated using the STATAll statistical software.
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formance, which made them attractive destinations for international
investors. But because the sample period begins in 1960 and the BRICs'
high-performing years are skewed toward the end of the sample, a BRIC
dummy that covers all four decades may not be able to capture the une-
ven growth performance of the BRICs over the sample period. There-
fore, in columns four through six, we replace the overall BRICs dummy
with a dummy that only measures the impact of the BRICs in the 1990s, a
decade where the BRICs' economic growth rate was clearly more notice-
able. While the HT estimator in column six still shows a negative, insig-
nificant effect, the results from the other two panel estimators now
exhibit a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for the
BRICs during the 1990s.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Several results emerge from our investigation. First, we find that de-
spite dramatic changes toward greater openness in trade and investment,
the BRICs can push their trade and investment reforms even further, al-
though the degree of future changes in openness varies from country to
country. Second, we find that the absolute and relative growth rates in
trade and investment flows that occurred over the past two to three de-
cades in each of the BRIC countries have been substantial and appear to
be sustainable. Third, we find evidence for a long-run equilibrium rela-
tionship in exports between the BRICs and the established leaders in
globalization-the G3; this is further evidence that the BRICs are on
their way to a shared leadership in world trade with the G3. Finally, we
find no evidence for a BRICs effect in explaining GDP per capita using
panel data models covering the 1960 to 2000 period. But if the BRICs
dummy is restricted to the last decade in the sample, there is evidence
that the effect is positive and statistically significant, thus lending credibil-
ity to the view that the BRICs will be the growth engine of the world
economy for years to come.
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Table 1: Trade Restrictiveness Indicators: G3 and BRIC, 2006-2009









Number of ranked countries: 125
Panel B: Ranking by MFN Tariff**









Number of ranked countries: 125
*OTRI: overall trade restrictiveness indicator; ** MFN tariff: most
favored nation tariff
Source: World Trade Indicators 2009/10, The World Bank, online
database.
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Source: Word Development Indicators 2009, The World Bank, CD-ROM.
Table 2: OTRI Ranking of BRIC, 2000-2009
2000-04 2005-08 2006-09 Latest
Brazil 82 86 88
Russia 81 85 84
India 88 84 78
China 73 55 28
Source: World Trade Indicators 2009/10, The World Bank, online database.
Table 3: FDI Restrictiveness Ranking of BRIC in 2010
(1=closed, 0=open)
Equity Key Operational Total FDI
Country Restrict. Screening Personnel Restrict. Index
Brazil 0.08 0 0.005 0.033 0.116
Russia 0.216 0.04 0.005 0.122 0.384
India 0.191 0.025 0.005 0 0.22
China 0.226 0.135 0.048 0.069 0.457
OECD 0.059 0.024 0.001 0.013 0.095
Source: OECD's FDI Restrictiveness Index (Kalinova et al., 2010).
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Figure 10: BRICs, Euro Area, US, Japan: FDI Outflows
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Table 4: Johansen's Cointegration Analysis
535
LR test (Lambda Critical Critical Critical
max test) values values values
Test At 20% Conclusion At 10% Conclusion At 5% Conclusion
statistic level level level
Null: r=0 coint 14.4 10.1 Reject 12.1 Reject 14.0 Reject
vectors Null Null Null
Altern: r=l coint
vectors
Null: r=1 coint 1.0 1.7 Accept 2.8 Accept 4.0 Accept





Test 20% Conclusion 10% Conclusion 5% Conclusion
statistic
Null: r=1 coint 1.0 1.7 Accept 2.8 Accept 4.0 Accept
vectors Null Null Null
Altern: r=2 coint
vectors
Null: r=0 coint 15.4 11.2 Reject 13.3 Reject 15.2 Reject
vectors Null Null Null
Altern: r=2 coint
vectors
*No cointegrating restrictions on the intercept parameter imposed; Var(p) order: p=2
Estimated cointegrating (long-run) relation (heteroscedasticity-consistent t-stats in parenthesis):
G3 = 9.4E1 1 (13.5) + 1.43 (16.4) BRIC.
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Table 5: Panel Estimates with Dummy for BRICs
Dependent Variable: log GDP per Capita (in 1996 PPP Dollars)
VARIABLES FE RE HT FE RE HT
log Nbr Veto Players (it) 0.039 0.054 0.039 0.032 0.046 0.045
(2.60)** (3.66)*** (2.61)*** (2.10)** (3.09)*** -1.56
Rule of Law (i) 0.71 0.894 0.722 0.882
(12.37)*** (7.81)*** (12.59)*** (6.62)***
log Trade Share (it) 0.241 0.076 0.241 0.229 0.078 0.252
(4.94)*** (2.32)** (4.96)*** (4.72)*** (2.41)** (4.34)***
Malaria Ecology (i) -0.037 -0.03 -0.036 -0.03
(-4.64)*** (-2.77)*** (-4.52)*** (-2.66)***
Dummy for BRICs -0.412 -0.104
(-1.26) (-0.26)
Dummy for BRICs in 90s 0.365 0.348 -0.308
(2.35)** (2.20)** (-0.26)
Constant 5.591 5.031 7.255 7.899
(10.35)*** (8.47)*** (38.17)*** (55.94)***
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 340
Number of countries 122 122 122 122 122 122
R-squared 0.13 0.983 0.151 0.982
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p< 0.1
